This note generalizes the notion of common p-beliefs to situations of ambiguity or Knightian uncertainty. When players have multiple prior beliefs, we show that Aumann's no-agreement theorem can be approximated. We also provide conditions under which purely speculative trade does not occur in the presence of ambiguity when players preferences are complete or incomplete.
Introduction
The notion of common belief was introduced by Monderer and Samet (1989) as a way of approximating common knowledge. They developed this concept and analyzed its implications for interactive decision making when the players are faced with situations of risk only. In scenarios of risk, each player forms beliefs over the possible states of the world using a single probability measure and evaluates actions using their subjective expected utility (Savage, 1954 and Anscombe and Aumann, 1963) . However, there are situations in which the players distinguish between risk which may be insured against by trading in markets and uncertainty, which may not. In particular Knight's (1921) description of uncertainty suggests that individuals may be averse to situations where a probability distribution over the states of the world is not objectively provided. Ellsberg's (1961) experiments provided evidence of this phenomenon and suggested that Savage's (1954) sure-thing principle might not be applicable in situations such as those described by Knight (1921) , where a decision maker faces cognitive or informational constraints that leave him uncertain about what odds apply to the payoff relevant events.
There is now a large literature on individual decisionmaking under Knightian uncertainty or ambiguity, starting with the multiple-prior models of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Bewley (1986) and the nonadditive probability model of Schmeidler (1989) . In the multiple-prior models, individuals use a set of probability measures rather than just a single probability measure to determine the expected utility from actions. The implications of these alternative theories of individual decision-making in interactive and market settings are now being widely analyzed (see the references in Ganguli, 2007) .
In this note, we extend the notion of common belief as an approximation of common knowledge to settings when the players have multiple-prior beliefs. We then examine whether the well known 'agreeing to disagree' theorem of Aumann's (1976) seminal work and the 'no speculative trade' results of Milgrom and Stokey (1982) can be extended to the setting of Knightian uncertainty. Monderer and Samet (1989) and Neeman (1996) generalized Aumann's (1976) result when the asymmetrically informed players have a common singleton prior and the posteriors held by the players are commonly p-believed. Ui (2005, 2006b ) established a version of the result that holds when the players share common multiple priors and the set of posteriors is commonly known.
A significant literature has focused on whether purely speculative trade exists in complete markets and the answer is negative even in the presence of asymmetric information. Milgrom and Stokey (1982) initiated this line of investigation by establishing that if such trade was common knowledge and the players were initially at a Pareto-optimal allocation, then the players would be indifferent between trading and not trading at all.
Halvey (2004) showed that speculative trade was possible with common knowlede among players with dynamically consistent, but non-consequentialist choice preferences. Wakai (2002) extended the MilgromStokey result to the Gilboa-Schmeidler (1989) model of multiple-priors. Sonsino (1995) and Morris (1999) showed that such trade is impossible if the players have singleton priors and it is commonly p-believed that all traders want to trade. We establish that if the players have dynamically consistent preferences, then in the presence of multiple priors, purely speculative trade is ruled out if the acceptance of trade is commonly p-believed.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce the notion of common belief in the presence of multiple priors in the next section. Sections 3 and 4 extend Aumann's (1976) no-agreement theorem and the nospeculation result of Milgrom and Stokey (1982) to the case of common belief with multiple priors and section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the full version of the paper (Ganguli, 2007 ).
Beliefs and common beliefs
(Ω, Σ) denotes a measurable space where Ω is the space of states of the world, with typical element ω, and Σ is the σ-algebra of events. Let {µ j } J j=1 denote a family of probability measures on (Ω, Σ) which are the extreme points of the closed convex set of measures µ. The set of players is finite and is denoted I while Π i is player i s (measurable) information partition of Ω with countably many elements. All elements in Π i have positive measure with respect to each µ j . Denote by F i the σ−algebra generated by Π i , i.e. F i is the collection of all unions of elements of Π i . We first note the notion that a player p-believes an event according to some measure in the set {µ j } J j=1 .
Definition 1 Player
The event that player i p-believes E according to measure j is given by
When players have multiple priors, the natural notion of p-belief is that a player p-believe any event according to all the measures in the set of priors as noted in the following. This notion of p-belief is also adopted by Ahn (forthcoming) for the specific case of common 1-belief as a definition of common knowledge. In the case of a singleton prior, Dekel (1987, 1993 ) provided a detailed analysis of why this 'almost sure' notion of knowledge is appropriate.
This definition of p-belief is consistent with the GilboaSchmeidler (1989) representation for complete preferences (see Chateneauf et al. (2007) for an axiomatization of countably additive multiple priors) and with the Bewley (1986) representation for incomplete preferences under Knightian uncertainty. The event that player i p-believes E at ω is given by
We now note some properties of the operator B p i that will be used in the results of sections 3 and 4. The following generalizes proposition 2 in Monderer and Samet (1989) to the case of multiple-priors.
The definition of common p-belief for the case of multiple priors is then just the same as the case for singleton prior.
Definition 3 An event C ∈ Σ is common p-belief at ω if there exists an evident p-belief E such that ω ∈ E and E ⊆ B Monderer and Samet (1989) show that common pbelief can also be characterized by an iterative prodedure, which is described in the following. First we define the iterative process itself.
The following result, which is essentially the same as proposition 3 in Monderer and Samet (1989) then shows that common p-belief is also characterized by the above iterative procedure in the multiple-prior case.
Proposition 2 For any event C and p
The second part of the above result establishes that E p (C) is the event that 'C is common p-belief' as in the case of a singleton prior.
Note that we have defined belief operators starting directly from probability measures instead of preferences, while the primary motivation for ambiguity is based on preferences. However, while abstract belief operators, such as those derived from preferences (Morris, 1997) , are more general, they do not allow quantification of beliefs.
3 Agreeing to disagree Aumann (1976) showed that the posteriors formed over an event by players, who share a common singleton prior, must coincide if they are commonly known. Monderer and Samet (1989) and Neeman (1996) generalized this result to case of common beliefs and showed that if the posteriors are common p-belief then they cannot differ by more than (1 − p) . We now note a generalization of this 'agreeing to disagree' result to the case of multiple prior p-beliefs. Given an event F ∈ Σ , let f ij (ω) = µ j (F |Π
Sinceμ is a closed convex set, for every x ∈ r i , there exists some µ ∈μ such that µ (F |Π i (ω)) = x. Denote by f i (ω) the closed convex hull of {f ij (ω)} n j=1 . Denote by C the event that {f ij } n j=1 = {r ij } n j=1 or equivalently f i = r i for all i, i.e., C = ∩ i∈I ω| f ij (ω)
Proposition 3 Suppose C is common p-belief at some ω ∈ Ω, then there existr i ∈ r i andr k ∈ r k such that |r i −r k | ≤ (1 − p)
The bound can in general not be improved as shown by the example in Neeman (1995) . Also, the next example shows that we can not do better than the existence of somer i ∈ r i andr k ∈ r k such that |r i −r k | ≤ (1 − p), i.e. it is not in general true that either
Let Ω = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} , ± = 2 Ω , and defineμ = {p ∈ ∆ (Ω) | p = λp 1 + (1 − λ) p 2 }, where p 1 (A) = a for A ∈ {{1} , {2} , {3}} , p 1 (A) = 2a for A ∈ {{4} , {1, 3}} , p 1 ({2, 4}) = 3a, and p 1 ({5}) = 1 − 5a and p 2 (A) = b for A ∈ {{1} , {2} , {4}} , p 2 (A) = 2b for A ∈ {{3} , {2, 4}} , p 2 ({1, 3}) = 3b, and p 2 ({5}) = 1 − 5b. Let the information partitions for player 1 (Π 1 ) and player 2 (Π 2 ) be Π 1 = {{1, 3} , {2, 4} , {5}} and Π 2 = {{1, 2, 3, 4} , {5}} .Then for the event F = {1, 2} , it is common 1-belief at state 1 that f 1 (1) = r 1 = [1/3, 1/2] and f 2 (1) = r 2 = {2/5}. So, r 1 ∩ r 2 = {2/5} and we also have that |r * 1 − r * 2 | = 1/15 > 0 and
In the above example, if the set of priors is not closed, i.e., if we just consider the extreme points {p 1 , p 2 } ofμ as the set of priors, then the players have no posterior beliefs in common even when these are commonly 1-believed.
Impossibility of speculative trade
We now consider whether it is possible for players to engage in speculative trade after the arrival of private information if it is common p-belief that all traders want to trade. Our presentation follows those of Milgrom and Stokey (1982) and Sonsino (1995) . In what follows, i are represented by the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1986) structure withμ as the closed and convex set of prior probabilities which is common across all players. In addition, we assume thatμ is rectangular with respect to all the elements A ∈ Σ, ensuring dynamic consistency, (Epstein and Schneider, 2003) and that the priors are mutually absolutely continuous, i.e., for any A ∈ Σ\∅, if there exists j 1 ∈ J such that µ j1 (A) = 0 then µ j (A) = 0 for all j ∈ J (Epstein and Marinacci, forthcoming).
If i are represented by the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1986) structure, then for any F i -measurable consumption contracts x, y : Ω → R L + ,
Monderer and Samet (1989) established that in the case of Bayesian games with a singleton prior µ, when the game being played is common p-belief among the players then for any Nash equilibrium strategy profile in the complete information game, there exists an equilibrium strategy profile in the incomplete information game that is very close to equilibrium strategy profile which would be played when the game is common knowledge. In particular Monderer and Samet (1989) prove this when the players behave as ε-maximizers for some ε ∈ R (suitably restricted), i.e., each player i has preferences i,ε where
We adopt the same approach to players preferences in the case of p-beliefs. So, in the case of multiple priors μ,
If x i,ε y, then player i weakly ε−prefers contract x to contract y.
When players have private information in the form of the partitions {Π i } i∈I , we denote the conditional (or ex-post) preferences of player i at ω ∈ Ω by i,ω so that
Also, we define i,ω,ε in the obvious way, i.e.
The endowment of player i is denoted by the
+ is F i −measurable for all i and i∈I x i (ω) ≤ i∈I e i (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. An allocation y is ex-ante Pareto optimal iff there is no feasible allocation x such that (a)
A feasible allocation x is ε−preferred to the endowment allocation e by the players at state ω, denoted
Denote by A (ε) the event that the players ε−prefer x to e, i.e. A (ε) = {ω|x ω,ε e} and using the result of proposition 2 denote by E p [A (ε)] the event that A (ε) is common p-belief.
We assume that ess sup µj |U i (x i (ω)) − U i (e i (ω))| ≤ M < ∞ for all j ∈ J and all i ∈ I, where ess sup µj denotes the essential supremum given measure µ j and M > 0. The following result shows that purely speculative trade can be ruled out under Knightian uncertainty if p is high enough.
Proposition 4 Let e be the ex-ante Pareto optimal endowment allocation and let x be a feasible allocation. For 1/2 < p ≤ 1 and ε ≥ (1 − p) M , Dow et al. (1990) first provided an example to show that purely speculative trade is possible with nonadditive expected utility. However, the updating rule they used for beliefs is the Dempster-Shafer rule, which does not ensure dynamic consistency in general. Kajii and Ui (2006a) showed that in the Gilboa-Schmeidler model with symmetric information, the existence of an agreeable bet on some event is stronger than the existence of an agreeable trade, unlike the singleton prior case. They also provided conditions when the two conditions are equivalent under multiple priors.
As a consequence of proposition 4, we can also rule out the possibility of speculative trade when players perceive ambiguity in the sense of Bewley (1986) and have incomplete preferences,
We can then define Defining the F i −measurable function z = x − y, we have that
If we normalize U i for all i so that U i (0) = 0, this observation allows us to obtain the following result for an exchange economy, called the Bewley economy, where the players preferences are B i i∈I and the endowment allocation is e = (e i ) i∈I , e i : Ω → R L + is F i −measurable for all i. Let x be a feasible allocation in this economy and denote by A (ε) the event that the players ε−prefer x to e , i.e. (a)
+ ε for all µ ∈μ for some i. 
Conclusion
We extend the notion of common belief to settings of ambiguity and showed that some results from the settings of risk continue to hold. Our analysis suggests that when ambiguity exists it can cause significant departures in outcomes of interaction among players unless fairly strict conditions are satisfied. We are currently investigating whether the 'no-trade' results hold if the requirement of dynamic consistency is weakened to that of consistent planning (Siniscalchi, 2006 ).
This note is a first step toward analysing the robustness of best-responses, in particular equilibrium actions, of players under Knightian uncertainity when common knowledge is approximated by common belief. We also propose to further generalize the notion to settings where the players have a (second-order) probability measure over their set of priors (see Klibanoff et al. (2005) for an analysis of decision making in this setting). This extension will allow for us to analyze a question that arises naturally in the case of multiple priors -what happens when players only p-believe an event with a subset of their set of priors?
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